P’yongyang, the capital of North Korea, fell to Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. forces on 19 October 1950. Five weeks after the Inch’on landing, United Nations (UN) forces had broken out of the Pusan Perimeter and Seoul had been recaptured. With ROK forces already across the 38th Parallel in pursuit of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA), General Douglas MacArthur received permission to conduct UN offensive operations to destroy the NKPA threat. That launched the race to the Yalu River. P’yongyang became an intermediate tactical objective along the way and logical site for the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) advanced command post. As expected, tactical UN and ROK commanders were focused on the continuing fight. Neither the strategic commander nor tactical commanders anticipated controlling large parts of North Korea, let alone two of its largest cities, including the capital.
Colonel Charles R. Munske led UN Civil Assistance Command Korea efforts in P’yongyang, and played a key role in UNCACK activities in Seoul.
Why is this relevant today? U.S. and coalition leaders had much the same priorities for Afghanistan and Iraq. President George Bush chose the capture of Baghdad to mark the end of hostilities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In 1950, the newly created UN did not want military government established in North Korea and the phrase “Civil Assistance” was coined to cover the P’yongyang mission. Fifty years later, U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams are conducting civil military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq just as Military Government teams did in North Korea in 1950. And, similar to recent events in Afghanistan and Iraq, the North Korea civil assistance campaign plan and the organization to carry out Phase Four activities (as they are now called) were approved after the perceived end of combat hostilities. In the midst of the ensuing chaos, North Korean citizens were denounced by neighbors as Communists in order to steal their property. Is that any different than people reporting somebody as a Taliban or Fedayeen in order to take possession of a truck, car, or house in Afghanistan or Iraq?
Not until after the capture of P’yongyang did General MacArthur approve the creation of a UN Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK) for all of Korea. It was a State Department-driven action that resulted in a “paper” organization containing more than one hundred personnel. UNCACK was initiated in Tokyo to help rehabilitate Seoul, provide humanitarian and civil assistance to refugees in the south, and to reestablish government, law, and order throughout North Korea. UNCACK stood up in Seoul just in time to organize its own evacuation to Taegu.
Dr. Syngman Rhee, President of Republic of Korea (South Korea)Kim Il Sung, Premier of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Despite the lack of attention by the strategic command, the small Civil Assistance (CA) Team accomplished great things in P’yongyang, Chinnamp’o, and in Pyongan-Namdo Province during its short thirty-seven day tenure from 29 October to 6 December 1950. The successes must be attributed to Colonel (COL) Charles R. Munske, Field Artillery—probably the most experienced Military Government officer in the Far East Command at the time. A veteran of both world wars, COL Munske had organized and run military governments in the Philippines, and had served as Military Governor of Kyushu, Japan, for two years. Having just returned to the Pacific theater in mid-October 1950, Munske was rushed to Seoul to organize civil assistance in South Korea. That mission was short-lived—his experience was critically needed in P’yongyang.
What follows are the experiences of COL Charles Munske and his team in P’yongyang and the surrounding towns and villages, told primarily in his own words. The information and excerpts are from Munske’s letters, notes, papers, and documents. As “the Civil Assistance man in P’yongyang,” who better to tell the story? [Direct quotes from COL Munske are indicated by italics.]
Map depicts UN assault on P’yongyang by the ROK 1st and 7th Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division, 19-20 October 1950.
Early in the morning of 24 October 1950, COL Charles Munske received a terse order from the EUSA G-3: “Organize a small military government team and proceed at once with the advancing troops to P’yongyang. Set up the local governments, prevent sickness, starvation, and unrest among the inhabitants and do what you can in the line of quick rehabilitation. Remember this is a United Nations effort and you will not actually set up military government. You will be known as a Civil Assistance Team and will act as such. The legal currency north of the 38th Parallel will be North Korean won and no South Korean political activities will be allowed until further instruction.” The G-3 concluded with: “Remember this is a United Nations occupation.”2
Munske’s proposed military government team table of organization and equipment reflected what was required to perform the mission competently, but per usual it was cut by two-thirds. Weapons and ammunition were readily available, but everything else was in short supply. Military government equipment and supplies, DDT, drugs, and medicines were virtually nonexistent. From available personnel, Munske organized a team of four officers, two UN civilians, one enlisted clerk, four enlisted drivers, an enlisted cook, and two Korean interpreters:
Mr. S.A.C. Lord, Major (MAJ) E.H. Davies, Captain (CPT) Davidson, CPT E. Ellingson, and First Lieutenant (1LT) Bruce Fisher joined the team on 10 November and were followed by Dr. A.K. Lee, preventive medicine physician, Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Livinston, and MAJ T.J. Cook. First Lieutenant John Golden, 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) Finance Officer, was also detailed to assist COL Munske in P’yongyang.3
Only two officers in North Korea had any military government experience: CPT Terrance Vangen had served in the post-WWII Korea occupation, and the Chinnamp’o Sub-team chief, CPT Loren E. Davis, had held a military government assignment in Okinawa, Japan.4 A few of the enlisted men had also served in military government companies. Munske’s team was composed of real good men, who were “Jacks of All Trades,” excellent connivers, and experienced midnight requisitioners—without which a lot of the work accomplished could never have been contemplated. Three ROK legal officers with their sergeants were also attached. The ROKs got plenty of training, but in addition they were very helpful.5
The CA team scrounged three Jeeps, a 1¼-ton truck, and a 2½-ton truck with ½-ton trailer. Then, they sat and waited for orders—which came nearly two days later. As the convoy rolled out of the Seoul University gate, the acting first sergeant surprised Munske with a dilapidated civilian truck pulling two ½-ton trailers loaded with equipment. The extra trailer was hooked to the 1¼-ton truck. Then, the trip—which turned out to be full of work, happiness, despair, and pathos—began.6
The day was beautiful, sunny, and warm, with a cold twang in the air. The road north was crowded with vehicles. The ground was dry and the road had about six inches of powdered dust on it. Every wheel that turned would raise the dust up into a cloud that settled on the vehicles and the occupants until everything was grayish. Everyone wore a scarf or a handkerchief tied around his face, trying to cover the nose and mouth, making it almost possible to breathe. It was out of the question to stop, and because our group was small and light, we weaved in and out of the long lines of slow moving vehicles headed north. The other side of the road, going south, also had considerable traffic—empty trucks and loaded ambulances, and occasionally a truckload of prisoners.7
UN troops encountered similar scenes to this friendly welcome in Chinnamp’o in each village and city they liberated during their drive into North Korea.United Nations Command units took great pleasure in marking their journey north across the 38th Parallel, many leaving signs such as this one created by the ROK 3rd Division.
People were in the streets and South Korean flags were everywhere in Kaesong. Every house seemed to have a flag. One officer said, “Either the 1st Cavalry Division or 2nd Infantry Division must have a flag vendor with them. How else could North Koreans get ROK flags so quickly?” As they crossed the 38th Parallel, signs were everywhere—courtesy of various units. Munske added a UNCACK sign. In Jonghyon-ni, Munske’s group saw bodies in the streets, houses burned down, and civilians being held prisoner by vigilantes. They witnessed a runaway detainee killed. Anyone could denounce another as a Red and have him arrested and his property confiscated.8
Early the next morning, 29 October, the CA team resumed its movement north at maximum speed. As the group wound through mountain passes, knocked out tanks stared at them from vantage points. Sariwon, a large city on the edge of the mountains, had been severely damaged in the fighting. Beyond the city was a large flat plain. Battle-damaged vehicles and artillery pieces littered the flanks of the road and stood skeleton-like in the cotton fields and rice paddies. Empty artillery shell casings, small arms debris, and ammo boxes and crates were everywhere. Large sections of rail track had been ripped up. Bomb craters pocked the ground. Trains were lying on their sides with the locomotives and cars riddled by thousands of bullets. Others stood burned on the tracks. Only the blackened walls of stations remained. Few bodies were seen despite heavy fighting just a few days previously. That changed in P’yongyang.9
Divided by the Taedong River, the west side of P’yongyang contained most of the population, government and municipal buildings, cultural centers, churches, numerous schools, and hotels. The east side of the city was mainly industrial, but a large housing project was nearing completion. Entering the eastern outskirts of the capital, the CA team drove by badly damaged factories. One was the American Corn Products Refinery Company. An American mobile army surgical hospital had already been erected nearby. Near the airfield (designated K-23) on the northeast side of the capital were signs pointing to Division and Corps command posts.10
The impressive, dual-span railroad bridge crossing the Taedong had suffered extensive damage in the fighting. Lone pilings stood bolt upright in the river where bridge sections had collapsed. The highway bridge had suffered a similar fate. The viaduct running from an island in the river to the mainland had been broken, and a large water pipe hung precariously over the water. By the time Munske’s team arrived, Army engineers had constructed a sizeable pontoon bridge to handle the heavy traffic. Troops and military police were everywhere. After crossing the bridge the CA group turned left along the river toward the city center. The journey took them past neatly stacked ammunition left behind at NKPA defensive positions, and streets filled with people wandering aimlessly. The drivers had to navigate through the numerous bodies of dead NKPA soldiers that lined the roads.11
While the CA team set up in the courtyard of an abandoned Japanese house for the night, COL Munske visited the city proper. He saw little damage from bombing or shellfire, but signs of heavy looting were everywhere—doors broken in, windows smashed, and household effects lying out in the streets. In the center of the city, he encountered more troops milling around, mostly American GI stragglers.12Dead bodies were lying in side streets and in the parks, and nightly shootings, rapes, and robbery were common.13
At the City Hall, COL Munske encountered some I Corps officers that he knew, one of whom was the military government officer, COL Melchoir. He briefed Munske on the situation, showed him on a map where the command posts of EUSA (Advance), I Corps, and IX Corps were located. The North Korean government formerly occupied the Presbyterian Missionary compound, the largest in Asia, and this is where Eighth Army set up its headquarters. Melchoir also informed Munske that his CA team would be attached to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team (ARCT) for logistical support. A tactical CA team from the 2nd Infantry Division had just taken over from the 1st Cavalry Division.
COL Melchoir ended by providing a list of supposedly good dependable citizens that could be counted as non-Communists. One of them had already been appointed city mayor. Munske could only muse: This was really rushing it, for there certainly had not been enough time to investigate the background of any of these people. However, it was now our problem.14 He quickly discovered that the city government set up by I Corps was simply going through the motions. Lacking money, it could only hire people on the promise of future payment, and without vehicles, the various departments—i.e., sanitation, public works, health and welfare, etc.—were inoperative.15
Unaware of the Louis Heren article in The Times (London)16 lambasting him and his colleagues, COL Munske entered City Hall and established UNCACK headquarters on the second floor. He reported to UNCACK in Seoul that the constant shifting of responsibilities was not conducive to good civil assistance management, especially since the tactical teams had ideas of their own.17 Later, he conceded that in spite of the changing unit boundaries and command responsibilities, the final outcome of the combined efforts of all CA activities could be considered satisfactory.18
During the team’s first night in P’yongyang, an NKPA soldier was killed by ROK MPs. Afterwards, they threw his body into the CA team yard—a warning from ROK Provost Marshal “Tiger” Kim, who wanted to be the military governor and did not want the Americans interfering with him.19 However, Munske’s orders were explicit that the Koreans would have no military government functions in North Korea nor were they to have any control over the civilian populace. They were not authorized to try civilians in courts; appoint town, city, or provincial leaders and officials; seize homes, property or businesses; nor interfere in any way with normal civilian activities. This was the function of the Civil Assistance Team or Military Government, by whatever name you called it.20
COL “Tiger” Kim had a reputation as a tough gangster, but being a close associate of President Syngman Rhee, he was immune from arrest. I had my troubles with him but they were minor, recalled Munske.21 He had much bigger problems: public utilities in poor shape; no water, lighting, or electricity; and no public transportation.22
This North Korean hundred-won note was legal currency during UNCACK’s administration of P’yongyang, though five- and tenwon notes were much more common denominations.
Planning and operations had to be done simultaneously since there was no time for long range planning. Based on his available officers, COL Munske established four sections: Public Health, Public Welfare, Public Safety, and Civilian Supply. The team leaders were responsible for organizing local and provincial governments assisted by the three ROK legal officers. Public Works, Finance, Transportation, Warehousing, Labor, and Billeting functions were also parceled out to the CA officers and enlisted men as the need arose. The situation was continually updated by team visits, conversations with any and all native Koreans willing to talk, and information from local Counter-Intelligence personnel, which included Major Moffat, who was from an old American missionary family that had served in Korea.23
Anyone not in complete sympathy with the Communist regime had disappeared in the last days before the North Korean government and troops evacuated. Some had been executed and others had been taken north. Some simply disappeared on their own. These were the ones Munske wanted to contact. Of the estimated 625,000 people living in P’yongyang in early 1950, only 300,000 remained.24 One positive aspect of the Communists’ flight was the predominantly anti-Red feeling among the populace.25
Map of P’yongyang in late November 1950. The Missionary Compound served as the Palace of Premier Kim Il Sung and then EUSA Forward Headquarters. The UN Civil Assistance Team for Pyongan-Namdo Province & P’yongyang established themselves in the City Hall. The American Corn Products Refinery complex became the last residence of the UN CA Team in December 1950.
Based on problems he encountered in the initial days of his administration, Munske soon established his objectives: set up a city government; start provincial governments, appoint mayors and governors, repair power plants because water was needed for sanitation and firefighting, simultaneously rebuild the water works, get the trolleys and trains operating, gather food, find North Korean won money plates, set up hospitals and welfare agencies, move ROK military squatters out of private homes, eliminate the thousands of ROK deserters, prevent the nightly looting and burning of buildings, and post proclamations effecting all of the above.26
Some of the other major issues Munske faced included: land reform, the looting of banks (ROK soldiers carrying off large rice bags of five-won notes made it difficult to obtain operating currency), and a prison fire.27 In a 1 November 1950 letter home, he described the bank situation: Every vault was dynamited and blown up. Money was scattered all over the floors. In a Russian bank the manager had started a fire in the vault before locking it and it was still burning. I have to gather up all of this money as it is the only available. Trying to pick the money out of the rubble is a job, but we are getting to it.28
While Brigadier General Frank S. Bowen Jr., 187th ARCT commander, assumed responsibility for Civil Assistance in P’yongyang on 2 November, COL Munske was there to make it happen. Bowen attended the first police school graduation and ordered that the five Japanese sake factories be dynamited.29 Those were Bowen’s major contributions to the CA effort in P’yongyang. Munske, writing to his wife by flashlight in his house (no lights, heat, water, or toilet facilities) in the missionary compound, and wearing multiple layers of clothing, revealed his frustrations: Everybody lives like pigs. No progress has been made. This is the worst situation that I have ever faced, and it is very depressing. We are trying to organize governments, get electric power and water back into the city, set up police and fire departments and do a million other things. Ironically, he concluded on a positive note: It doesn’t seem that we will ever get anywhere with this setup. One of these days all the pieces of this puzzle will fall into its proper place and we shall lick it.30
After working at City Hall all day, Munske and his small team routinely traveled to EUSA headquarters to eat and attend updates. The only safe nighttime activity was to chase fires. On 6 November, the NKPA prisoners of war set their prison on fire. Hundreds among the several thousand prisoners there died. While surveying the damage afterwards, the CA team discovered more than two thousand bodies buried in the prison yard.31 An estimated three thousand partisans and stay-behind NKPA being hunted by UN troops (primarily the 187th ARCT) during the day were responsible for most night fires and sabotage.32
Mounted South Korean soldiers “ride herd” on a prisoner as he is marched through a P’yongyang street to a prisoner-collection point. A bicycling North Korean citizen, wearing an armband that identifies him as an anti-Communist, joined the parade.
These are very hectic days trying to establish law and order here. The whole sky is red with fire. A really big one is burning in the pouring rain. We have no way to stop fires here since we have no fire engines. The Commies took them all north. Even if we had some we have no water in the city since they destroyed the entire water system. The CA team stopped the spread of that fire by using their trucks and cables to pull adjacent wooden buildings down. A few days afterwards, the team found three fire trucks twenty miles north of the city, where they had been strafed and bombed by UN fighters. Though all were in very bad condition, they were towed back to the city in hopes that one usable truck could be built from the three wrecks. That was accomplished and a Fire Department was established at the end of November 1950.33
On 9 November, Munske’s toughest problem was handling the ROK troops and South Korean youth groups who were causing a lot of trouble. They were out and out ‘carpetbaggers,’ taking what they wanted and shipping it South. The ‘kangaroo courts’ held by these South Korean patriotic youth groups made the local populace resentful.34 They are treating the people here as though they are still Commies and are robbing and shooting them. If I could get them moved out of here, at least half of our troubles would be over.35 The five thousand ROK military personnel (including ROK Air Force personnel without airplanes and Navy sailors without boats) scrounging food and supplies, caretaking houses for their commanders, and stragglers and deserters, were causing mayhem. They took rice, millet, vegetables, machinery, clothing, and medicine, and shipped it south on trucks confiscated from the villages. Two rice mills were operated by the 8th Regiment, 7th ROK Division. When a ROK Air Force officer demanded the first one thousand bags of rice harvested in Mirim-ni, seven miles east of P’yongyang, Munske figured that they would have to look for a new mayor shortly.36 With the ROK military having a three week headstart on foodstuffs, Munske’s team struggled to collect rice and millet to put in central storage for emergencies.37
The UN Civil Assistance Command was the primary agency for managing and administering aid to refugees. In P’yongyang, it also served as a the military government and helped establish a new civilian government in the city.
As the central UN supply agency for North Korean won, the UNCACK team was stringently doling out money to American units, while ROK Army units were discarding what they had stolen earlier because they could buy nothing with it. To keep repairs and reconstruction going, COL Munske was spending between one and two million won per day.38 All the factories had either been systematically sabotaged by the Reds or looted by the ROK military. Money was essential to rehabilitation. The coal miners would not work without pay or rice and they were critical to restoring electrical power for lighting and to operate the water pump system for the city.39 The CA team recovered forty-six million won in five- and ten-won notes. Payments to contractors were usually stuffed in large rice sacks and carried away in oxcarts. Despite its illegality, South Korean won brought north by the ROK military, Seoul officials, and railway personnel complicated the situation.40
NKPA forces still controlled the northern half of Pyongan-Namdo Province and the ROK I Corps divisions were still fighting. Munske revised his initial estimate that the war was practically over. He now saw that it could drag out for a long time.41 On 11 November 1950, IX Corps troops passed through the North Korean capital on their way to the front to prepare to continue the EUSA offensive.42
While the Highway Bridge (right) across the Taedong River had been destroyed, U.S. Army engineers quickly erected a pontoon bridge (left) to reconnect East and West P’yongyang until the Highway Bridge could be repaired.The 2nd Infantry Division was responsible for hundreds of POWs after the fall of P’yongyang. Makeshift holding areas were established in streets and in open areas, such as the basin in front of Eighth Army Headquarters in northern P’yongyang.
On the positive side, Dr. Kassel found no signs of serious illness, malnutrition, or other health problems in P’yongyang, Chinnamp’o, and the surrounding villages. But, as Mr. Lord noted, sanitation was always deplorable everywhere. Six hospitals were made operational in the CA team’s short tenure in P’yongyang.43
Vital to restoring order to P’yongyang was a competent police force. The first class from the Police Training Camp graduated on 12 November 1950, with speeches given by BG Bowen of the 187th ARCT, the mayor of P’yongyang, and COL Munske.
The city police department was also functioning, and a police school, organized by MAJ Jack Young, 2nd Infantry Division, was conducting accelerated training classes. A cadre of South Korean national police had been requested to officer the several hundred policemen.44 On 15 December 1950, the city police force was to be increased to three thousand effectives.45
P’yongyang was being governed as a “special city,” separate from the provincial government. The CA team later consolidated bureaus in the city government to eliminate redundancy.46Our first plans are to follow the governmental system in use since the occupation of North Korea. Colonel Munske made it clear to the Stars and Stripes that the system was not a military government. We allow the newly-appointed local officials as much of the burden of administration as they possibly can handle, with our officers serving only as advisers.47
While Korean custom normally dictated that an elder male scholar be used in the higher echelons of government, it was felt that if such a man was not available to handle the demands of forming a new government, a younger man ought to be selected. Records of numerous persons were carefully scrutinized for capable leaders. Underground sources helped them find personnel acceptable to the majority. Then, a public meeting was set in the city auditorium to discuss the gubernatorial candidates in a democratic forum. Public Notices of decisions, authenticated by COL Munske’s chop (seal), were posted afterwards.48
Munske and his team were making good progress by mid-November. Pyongan-Namdo Province officials were installed on 13 November. An interim governor, Kim Sung Chu, nominated by President Syngman Rhee, had actually served for a week. Non-potable water was now being pumped into the systems on both sides of the Taedong River, and limited lighting was available on the east side. One nearby coal mine was operating, but it only furnished enough coal to run one power plant. Several local citizens requested permission to print newspapers. In an interim report to Seoul dated 12 November 1950, COL Munske stated that generally, things have been in a chaotic condition, but slowly we are beginning to see slight changes for the better.49
By mid-November, COL Munske thought that they were beginning to get control of the crime wave in the city, though nightly rapes persisted. Conditions outside the city were still tough. Guerrillas operated at will, daily attacking military convoys and running rampant in the small villages. To the south of P’yongyang, strong enemy attacks were being made against the UN forces, which included Turks and Filipinos.50
In the north, the Americans and British were preparing for the final push to the Yalu. Still, increasing contact with Chinese soldiers is still unresolved. Everyone is holding his breath. However we are not greatly worried. We are just damned sore. We had expected the fighting to be over by now.51 Despite growing tactical evidence in the form of several hundred Chinese POWs, denial of a Chinese threat by Tokyo sufficed, especially since extremely cold weather reduced active patrolling by troops lacking winter clothing.
A single working fire “truck” (actually a motorcycle) was available to fight fires in P’yongyang in late 1950. This demonstration of the pumper’s power took place in front of the damaged City Hall, which can be seen in the center background.
In the meantime, the senior UN Civil Assistance advisor was plagued by law and order challenges. After meeting with the ROK Commander in Chief MAJ Ly, the Counterintelligence Division commander, and MPs the night before, COL Munske joined a 20 November raid on a gang of racketeers. Youth groups became black marketeers under the guise of South Korean patriotic organizations. They had been robbing everything they could. After their raid on the gangsters, Munske investigated a cave twelve miles outside the city where a big guerrilla arsenal had been found. The UNCACK team got an unexpected bonus from the counterguerrilla operations: two captured Russian trucks and a Russian Jeep.52
Bob Hope’s USO Tour was always a raving success, and the show in P’yongyang was no different. Shown here with President and Mrs. Syngman Rhee in Seoul, Bob Hope and Marilyn Maxwell headlined the wildly popular show.
In mid-November, UN soldiers enjoyed an unexpected treat: “The greater portion of the day was spent patrolling, attending [winter] clothing classes, and enjoying the Bob Hope Show. The two-hour comedy show was thoroughly enjoyed by everyone.” “No one who saw the show could forget Marilyn Maxwell’s sweater, the acrobatics of the Taylor Maids, the wit of Jerry Colona, the music of Les Brown, and, most of all, the great man himself. It was hard to imagine that Bob Hope was actually in P’yongyang,” said Private First Class Jimmy Marks, A Battery, 61st Field Artillery Battalion.53
COL Munske was too busy to attend the show. He was escorting official visitors throughout the city, explaining and showing what the CA team had accomplished. After dinner with Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, Munske was called back to Seoul to talk with U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio about conditions in the North Korean capital. This was prompted by a Christian Science Monitor article noted by Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In Seoul, COL Munske found the UN Civil Assistance Command Korea well ensconced in the Bonto Hotel. The UNCACK was concerned about guerrilla activities affecting work throughout Korea. Perhaps to make up for a busy Thanksgiving, in Munske’s absence, CA team sergeants found the Russian ambassador’s old desk and some nice leather chairs, which they set up in their chief’s room in P’yongyang.55
When Munske returned from Seoul on 27 November, he was accompanied by Brigadier General Crawford F. Sams, MacArthur’s Chief of Public Health and Welfare. General Sams wanted to visit city hospitals and clinics before going up to the front where fighting was heavy. The night before, “Bed Check Charlie” had bombed K-23 airfield and everyone had been put on alert to defend the city.56 Although Lieutenant General Walton Walker had formally told everyone that extremely large numbers of Chinese were breaking through Eighth Army lines, Munske calmly reassured his wife, Don’t worry about the Reds shoving us out of P’yongyang. We have British, Filipino, ROK, and American troops here. I’m not worried. UN troops are moving north now. The 7th Infantry Division has reached the Manchurian border and is sitting there.57
The uncertainty of the situation enabled COL Munske to survive an assassination attempt by guerrillas. It happened about the time of the big UN push to the Yalu River in the northwest. The mayor, police chief, and I were supposed to discuss contingencies in the event a withdrawal became necessary. A group of Communist guerrillas figured to kill all of us. Fortunately, the ROK Counter Intelligence Corps discovered the plot and arrested the ringleaders. The group was ‘loaded for bear;’ the eleven were packing rifles, pistols, and grenades. One was a trusted police lieutenant.59
Despite most of the heavy fighting taking place in the northern part of Pyongan-Namdo Province, COL Munske and his CA team tried to conduct business as usual in order to dispel any thoughts of panic. But, local officials and medical personnel were getting very jittery because when they accepted positions in the government established by us, they automatically signed their death warrants with the Communists. Witness to the long line of troops coming back through P’yongyang, beaten, haggard, and dirty they knew that the Chinese Army had hit U.S. hard and practically destroyed the ROK army. Evacuation was only a matter of time.60
“Around Thanksgiving, word came up that the Eighth Army was going to launch a general attack all along the front. We were told that theater intelligence believed the Chinese in the area would fall back into Manchuria … It looked like this would be the final stage of the war, and that we’d all be home by Christmas. That same night, the night the UN offensive was supposed to be in full swing, all hell broke loose. All that night we were engaged almost continuously in firefights.”65 — CPT Sherman Pratt, B Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division.
On 1 December, during his visit to 8th Army headquarters, COL Munske was told that the 2nd Infantry Division had been “cut to pieces;” only forty percent of the division survived. The 9th Infantry Regiment that had been in P’yongyang had lost sixteen hundred of its assigned two thousand men. General Sams discovered that his son-in-law, a battalion surgeon in the 9th Infantry, had been killed when his aid station had been overrun. Shortly afterwards, the 1st Cavalry Division was hit hard and the U.S. units began to fall back. Munske was told that the EUSA advance headquarters was reestablishing itself east of the Taedong, effectively cutting P’yongyang in half. He was instructed to handle the refugees (“Keep the people out of the Army’s way”), to insure that repaired facilities were destroyed, and to use his judgment as to when to leave.61
Map reveals the extent of the UN advances in the east and west after five CCF (Communist Chinese Forces) Armies launch massive counterattacks to halt the Allied offensive and cause withdrawals south of the 38th Parallel.
COL Munske gathered the city and province government officials and told them to assemble everyone who worked for the UN governments and UN forces and tell them to prepare to move.62 Medical and public health personnel, the few remaining Christian missionaries, and the police force were included. The next day, 2 December, American unit after unit was rushing “pell-mell” through the capital to cross the pontoon bridges while CA was told to stand by. Military government is a peculiar thing, observed Munske.63
“Bed Check Charlie” bombed the airfield again that night. On Sunday, 3 December, COL Munske assembled the “official” group of more than two thousand North Korean refugees and personally escorted them across the pontoon bridge to the east side of the river Taedong, and installed them in the old American Corn Products factory near the railway station. Another one hundred thousand people gathered along the river were warned that the Filipinos guarding the crossing site would shoot them if they attempted to use the pontoon bridge. The CA team delivered several tons of rice to the factory to feed the “official” group while it waited for its train to safety.64
Detailed limits of advance by UN regimental forces when they are countered by CCF Armies.
Back at City Hall, COL Munske issued destruction and distribution orders to his team. The two newly built power plants, water system and machinery, printing presses, and Radio P’yongyang, were to be destroyed. Ninety-six crates of South Korean currency plates seized by the Communists in Seoul were loaded aboard trains heading south. The underground weapons factory found hidden in an abandoned lead mine between the towns of Sinchon and Yonam-Ni on the Pallyu River (BV 6346) was destroyed by combat engineers from the 187th ARCT. All freight cars on the west side of the river were rigged for demolition. Rice and millet in the UNCACK warehouse were distributed freely to the city’s residents; two tons were placed on the steps of City Hall for people to help themselves.66
Shortly after lunch, COL Munske was surprised by an unexpected visitor. Captain Loren E. Davis, chief of the CA Sub-Team at Chinnamp’o, reported to him for instructions. He had just driven forty miles through guerrilla-controlled territory to collect medical supplies and planned to spend the night in P’yongyang. Munske quickly explained how precarious things were in the city and ordered him to return immediately with his medicines. He was not to await any further orders from him—leave when the U.S. troops (3rd Logistical Command) left the port. Captain Davis remembered, “I jumped back into my Jeep and we set a speed record getting back. Burning up the engines was the least of my concerns.”68
After making another tour of the deserted city in his Jeep, COL Munske had his team pack up in the missionary compound and moved across the river to safety.69 That night, 3 December, the CA team occupied a hospital building with intact windows, sheltering from the below-freezing conditions. About 2130 hours, the sentry reported a large fire nearby. Within an hour, they heard small arms begin to pop and explosions became progressively louder until the team realized that mortar and artillery shells were exploding. The nearby ammo dump was on fire. Fragments of iron and steel fell ringing on the roof like heavy hailstones while those hitting the streets shot off sparks.
As UN troops withdrew from P’yongyang in the face of the Chinese offensive, they were forced to leave behind valuable equipment and supplies. In order to keep resources out of enemy hands, units destroyed vehicles, burned fuel, and generally followed a “scorched earth” policy during the evacuation.
Suddenly, there was a terrific explosion, far worse than any before, and then all the windows, frames, and sashes blew into the room. The explosion knocked everyone down, and the glass and flying debris struck, inflicting cuts and bruises, and overturning a heating stove to start a fire. While Dr. Kassel administered first aid, the stove was dragged outside. But, before anyone could recover, the building was racked by another explosion, louder and bigger than before. Colonel Munske and CPT Stack were physically lifted off the floor and tossed into the makeshift kitchen area. That caused Munske to yell, Let’s get out of here! and lead everyone out the back door. The brick buildings across the street were falling down, whole walls were collapsing, so we kept going down deeper into the Korean village. We finally stopped and huddled up, cold as hell, freezing, weather below zero, and a sorry looking lot. About 0500 hours, a few men went to check the trucks. Miraculously, not one of our vehicles was touched.70
After dawn, the cold and very disheveled group returned to its old building. The walls were pockmarked with shell craters and splattered with bullet holes. The yard looked like an iron scrap yard, bent and twisted iron all over the place, including some whole [mortar and artillery] shells which had not exploded. The only visible casualty—a dead dog.71 A couple officers were sent to the American Corn Products factory to tell the “official” North Korean refugees that no train was coming for them. Only seventeen of the two thousand were still there. The officers told them to leave.72 The P’yongyang city CA team chief had reached a decision point.
Colonel Munske crossed back over the Taedong to make a final reconnaissance. There was only a British tank company securing the bridgehead. At City Hall only the custodians remained. The building in the missionary compound that housed the EUSA advance headquarters contained only four Signal Corps soldiers awaiting final orders from the Signal Officer. Since there were no telephones and no one else around, COL Munske told them to leave. After burning all the papers in his office that he could not carry, the CA Team chief told the remaining policemen to seek safety across the river. CPT Vangen escorted them across the pontoon bridge while Munske mused.
“I sat there smoking a good cigar trying to think what to do next. I figured that it was time to leave.”—COL Charles R. Munske, P’yongyang, 4 December 1950
I sat there smoking a good cigar trying to think what to do next. I figured that it was time to leave. I had completed my mission, but was worried about the other three hundred thousand people still left in the city. About 85 percent of them were Christians, the largest number being Presbyterian, second largest Methodists, and third were the Catholics. He concluded that he could do nothing more for them and drove to the pontoon bridge, where the final calamity awaited him.73
At the bridge, MAJ Sullivan, commander of the POW military police detachment, stopped him to say that a train for the “official” North Korean refugees and the remaining eight hundred political prisoners in the jail had just arrived to take them to Chinnamp’o. Captain Gerard was dispatched to the prison where he found that the guards had run away with the keys. As a parting gesture, CPT Gerard and the police delivered bags of rice to each cell for the inmates and helped the few remaining “official” refugees aboard their train. During Munske’s last check of I Corps Headquarters, two civilian assistance officers asked to join him. Then, he met a patrol that told him that the Chinese were only four miles from the city. With only a British tank company between them and the approaching Communists, COL Munske led his convoy out of the city on the afternoon of 4 December 1950.74
U.S. and South African Air Force F-51 Mustangs were flying out of P’yongyang’s East Airfield (K-23) by mid-November 1950. The F-51 squadrons had just completed their move to K-23 on 22 November when the Chinese offensive forced them to displace south after only ten days in the north. The F-51s never missed a day of air strikes, but the squadrons did destroy and abandon considerable equipment when they left P’yongyang.
The UN civil assistance to P’yongyang ended when COL Munske and his CA convoy joined the thousands of refugees headed south along the main P’yongyang–Seoul road. The Chinnamp’o CA team did not depart North Korea until 6 December, when a naval covering force of two Australian, one American, and three Canadian destroyers escorted the ammunition ships and the landing ship tank carrying the CA team out of the river estuary.75 Since the I Corps Advance at Sinmak had no wire or radio communications to contact the CA Sub-Team at Haeju, a light airplane was sent to tell them to withdraw to Seoul.76
The CA team made quite a caravan when it departed P’yongyang. The October convoy of three Jeeps, one 1¼-ton truck, one 2½-ton (six-by-six) truck and a Korean civilian truck had grown to five Jeeps, two 1¼-ton trucks, one 2½-ton truck, and four Russian trucks loaded down with equipment plus rice, gasoline, clothing, refugees, and two geese. We had to leave the horse behind—couldn’t get him on the truck. We looked like Delaney Street on the move. No one had washed or shaved for three days. All vehicle side curtains had been removed and the windows knocked out. Every officer, soldier, and civilian had their weapons pointed out as they ‘ran the gauntlet’ through guerrilla-held territory. It was quite a ‘gypsy’ caravan.77
“When we withdrew through P’yongyang, the company passed a railroad spur where I counted thirty-two new Pershing tanks on flat cars. Soldiers were thrusting thermite grenades down their gun muzzles. It made me sick! And, when my first sergeant, Mitchell, and Sergeant Jim Huber were confronted by the major responsible for burning a heaping pile of winter clothing, they held a carbine on him while they loaded the truck, and were gone before reinforcements arrived.” — CPT Norman Allen, I Company, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division.67
At 1500 hours on 5 December 1950, Radio Tokyo (Broadcasting Corporation of Japan) announced the official UN abandonment of P’yongyang. This was not broadcast on Psywar radio because it was not an official communiqué. Instead, on the night of 5 December, Psywar radio, limited to the UN Command directives, reported that “United Nations forces continued to consolidate defensive positions south of P’yongyang.”78
During the retreat from P’yongyang, Army engineers were confronted with the disheartening task of destroying bridges they had so recently repaired or rebuilt. Engineers rigged this bridge near P’yongyang with explosives on 1 December, preparing to blow it once UN troops had passed. This was the bridge guarded by CPT Samuel S. Walker, 24th ID.
Sometime on 7 December 1950, COL Munske and his team reached Seoul. His team was disbanded and the officers sent to handle refugee problems. Colonel Munske was sent to Taegu on 9 December because if the Eighth Army retreats any further, this city will become the headquarters, and that is why I am here. I was ordered to set up a rear echelon headquarters, and to write a report on the evacuation of P’yongyang. Truth be known, I think I got too much publicity, and they are shoving me into the background for a while. I was outdrawing the general in newspaper articles, and that’s not good.79
Later (14 December 1950), in a letter to his son Richard, COL Munske confided that despite the excitement at the end I wish that we could have stayed in P’yongyang, for we were really doing a swell job getting things going. Always an optimist, Munske concluded, Now that the whole city has been burnt down, it is going to be much harder to get things going if we ever go back.80
Communist forces retook P’yongyang on 5–6 December 1950. Much of the city infrastructure and stockpiled military supplies had been dynamited or burned by U.S., British, and South Korean troops. The British liaison officer at Far East Command reported back to London on what he called “the unusual situation:” U.S. troops having to fight their way back through guerrillas while being harassed by Chinese from the North.82
The impending Chinese invasion sent millions of North Koreans south. Refugees from P’yongyang streamed across the remains of the Taedong River Railroad Bridge, climbing twisted girders and balancing on broken railroad ties.
Despite all their frustrations in the process, COL Charles R. Munske in P’yongyang and CPT Loren E. Davis in Chinnamp’o managed major civil affairs feats in these two North Korean cities, with minimal assistance. Unfortunately, the tide of war radically changed with the massive intervention of the Red Chinese armies. Virtually all signs of progress were explosively demolished as the Eighth U.S. Army withdrew to the 38th Parallel and then further south to regroup. Still, this is a tribute to the capabilities of CA officers and soldiers who were tasked to make civil assistance happen in North Korea in late 1950, and to today’s Civil Affairs soldiers “making it happen” in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The P’yongyang article would not have been possible without the assistance of Ms. Judy Munske, daughter of COL Charles Munske, who granted me access to her father’s papers and family correspondence. Excerpts from his letters and reports enabled this experienced Civil Military Government officer to describe the numerous challenges of restoring order, rebuilding the infrastructure, and caring for the people in the North Korean capital and to share the small triumphs and myriad of frustrations while retaining his optimism.
ENDNOTES
C. Darwin Stolzenbach and Henry A. Kissinger, Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51 (Department of Army, Operations Research Office, ORO-T-184, 12 May 1952), 23.[return]
Charles R. Munske, Chief, P’yongyang and P’yong-dan Province CA Team, Eighth U.S. Army, Korea Forward, North Korea, undated handwritten notes, 19 October–5 December 1950, courtesy of Judy Munske, copies in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Munske Papers. [return]
Munske Papers; Report on Activities of the Pyongan-Namdo Civil Assistance Team (n.d.), copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Munske Undated Report. [return]
Loren E. Davis, telephone interview by Dr. Charles H. Briscoe, 2 February 2005, digital recording, USASOC History Office Classified Files, hereafter cited as Davis interview, 2 February 2005.[return]
Munske Papers; Eighth U.S. Army Korea Civil Assistance Command, Pyongan-Namdo Province, APO 301, Interim Report dated 12 November 1950, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter cited as Munske Interim Report. [return]
Charles R. Munske, letters to his wife, 2 and 3 November 1950, copies in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 2 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Conditions in Seoul were not much better. Munske said their billets were like a refrigerator and the office was a constant icebox. Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 24 October 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. [return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7 November 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 3 November 1950; Munske Undated Report. [return]
Eighth U.S. Army Korea Civil Assistance Team, Pyongan-Namdo Province, APO 301, undated report, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files. (This is presumedly the 30 November 1950 monthly activities report promised by Munske in his 12 November 1950 Interim Report).[return]
Charles R. Munske, letters to his wife, 9 and 12 November 1950, copies in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Undated Report; Gordon Walker, “Political Vacuum Jars Pyongyang: Chaos Balks Interim Unit,” Christian Science Monitor, November 1950: “The EUSA has set up a local civil assistance team of six officers which is now attempting to establish an interim civil government. But it lacks detailed instructions, personnel, and the ability to enforce what orders it puts out.” [return]
Munske Interim Report; Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 3 November 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7 November 1950; Munske Undated Report.[return]
Munske Interim Report; Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 3 November 1950.[return]
Munske Interim Report; Eighth U.S. Army Korea Civil Assistance Command Public Safety Office, P’yongyang City Police Training Camp, 1st Term Graduation Ceremony, 12 November 1950; Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 12 November 1950; Munske Undated Report.[return]
Munske Interim Report; Public Notice dated 13 November 1950, and Public Notice #2 dated 26 November 1950, copies in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Private Hal Gamble, “UN Government Work Above Parallel,” Stars and Stripes, 7 November 1950.[return]
Munske Interim Report; Public Notice; Public Notice #2. The water supply of P’yongyang was obtained from a series of wells on sand bars in the Taedong River. These wells were necessary because the river froze in the winter. Crawford F. Sams, “Medic”: The Mission of an American Military Doctor in Occupied Japan and Wartorn Korea (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 231.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 16 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 16 November 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 19 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Munske Undated Report.[return]
Donald Knox, The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History (NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 422–24.[return]
Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 53–54.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 23 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 28 November 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 23 November 1950.[return]
D.M. Giangreco, War in Korea 1950-1953 (New York, NY:Presidio Press, 1990), 128.[return]
Frank McKeown, “Colonel Who Made It Hard Way Is Feted,” The News (New York), 23 June 1957, M6.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letters to his wife, 1 and 2 December 1950, copies in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Munske Undated Report.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 5 December 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Date of this letter does not track with chronology of events cited in 7(?) December letter. [return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 5 December 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 5 December 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7(?) December 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Sherman Pratt, “A New Enemy,” in Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 64. [return]
Pratt, “A New Enemy,” 64; Munske Undated Report.[return]
Knox, The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History, 658.[return]
Davis interview, 2 February 2005; Munske Undated Report; Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7(?) December 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7(?) December 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7(?) December 1950.[return]
Hal Boyle, “Brooklyn Colonel Sad At Leaving Pyongyang: Munske Was Tempted To Burn City Hall,” The Bradenton Herald, 7 December 1950, 84, 85, 8A.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7(?) December 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7(?) December 1950; Munske Undated Report.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 7(?) December 1950.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his wife, 18 December 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Captain Max W. Dolcater, “Evaluation of Enemy and Friendly Broadcasts with Respect to UN Military Operations and Pertinent Recommendations: Undated Report to Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2 Section, GHQ, Far East Command, in Murray Dyer, Strategic Psywar in FEC, ORO-T-4 (FEC), (Washington DC:Department of the Army, 31 January 1951), 38.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letters to his wife, 8 and 9 December 1950, copies in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Charles R. Munske, letter to his son Richard, 14 December 1950, copy in Munske Papers, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.[return]
Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, 120.[return]
Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, 126.[return]
Lieutenant Clark C. Munroe, The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea 1950-1951 (Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 1952), 51.[return]
Donald Knox, The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 400, 413.[return]
Lloyd Kreider, “Into the Tunnel,” in Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 57–59.[return]
William Chambers, “Death All Day,” in Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War, 48–49.[return]
Roy E. Appleman, US Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1961), 656–57.[return]
Edwin P. Hoyt, On to the Yalu (New York: Stein & Day, 1984), 242–43.[return]
Colonel Kenneth K. Hansen, Psywar in Korea (Washington, DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, OJCS, 1960): 91.[return]
Captain Max W. Dolcater, “Evaluation of Enemy and Friendly Broadcasts with Respect to UN Military Operations and Pertinent Recommendations,” Undated Report to Chief, Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2 Section, GHQ, Far East Command in Murray Dyer, Strategic Radi Psywar in FEC, ORO-T-4 (FEC) (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 31 January 1951): 31–32, 39–40. Long-range and short-wave frequencies were different for each broadcast to preclude enemy jamming. This tactic created major problems for the listener who had to constantly change frequencies every half hour. As Major Tom Matthews and Captain Max Dolcater worked to get Radio P’yongyang operational, the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, recently arrived in Tokyo, sent officers and soldiers throughout recently repatriated South Korea to rebuild stations. Captain Robert A. Leadley, Lieutenants Ernest H. Luick, William Eilers, and Robert J. Morris, and Corporals Devere D. Doerr and Arnold Tepfer covered South Korea, getting stations back on the air and then back into the network. Hansen,Psywar in Korea, 85.[return]
Dolcater, “Evaluation of Enemy and Friendly Broadcasts with Respect to UN Military Operations and Pertinent Recommendations,” 26–27.[return]
